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LITIGATION AND RELITIGATION:
THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS
Brenda Soloff*
In its 1975 and 1976 Terms, the Supreme Court imposed the
first serious limitations on federal habeas corpus for state pris-

oners' after decades of procedural and substantive expansion of the
scope of the writ. 2 The results to date have been inconsistent and
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. A.B., 1960,
Brooklyn College; LL.B., 1963, Columbia University. Professor Soloff is a former
Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York.
1. See text accompanying notes 21-24 infra.
2. Although habeas corpus for state prisoners is defined by statute, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-2254 (1970), its scope has been a matter of judicial interpretation. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2503 (1977), the Court indicated its "historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the
statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." Indeed, the
Court acknowledged that "[w]hile the 'rhetoric celebrating habeas corpus has
changed little over the centuries,' . . . the functions of the writ have undergone
dramatic change." Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349 (1973) (footnote
omitted). There is substantial disagreement over the original scope of the writ of
habeas corpus as a remedy for unjust detention. See Oaks, Legal History in the High
Court-HabeasCorpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966). Compare Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 399-421 (1963). It is certain, however, that the availability of federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners, first authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14
Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1970)), reached its fullest expression in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Both Brown and Noia held that the writ is available to redetermine the merits of
constitutional questions already determined by the states. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 409 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 464 (1953). Noia came close to taking
the position that the broad view it espoused was implicit in the original understanding of the writ and hence was the meaning of the writ as embodied in the suspension clause. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 405-06 (1963). But see Oaks, supra at 458-68.
See also Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HAxv. L. REv. 441, 483-500 (1963). Fay v. Noia also dramatically lowered
procedural bars to the availability of the writ. See note 10 infra and accompanying
text. A series of post-Noia cases has minimized, virtually to the point of nonexistence, the requirement of custody to secure relief. See Hensley v. Municipal Court,
411 U.S. 345 (1973) (release on one's own recognizance is custody); Braden v. 30th
Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (petitioner not in custody on charge or
physically present in district where writ sought); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234
(1968) (petitioner completed sentence during pendency of application); Peyton v.
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (petitioner not yet serving sentence for conviction attacked).
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fragmentary, 3 largely because there has been no systematic rethinking of the purposes of habeas corpus. Indeed, the decisions either
ignore the traditional functions of habeas corpus or reflect 4an inchoate feeling that habeas jurisdiction has become too broad.
By statute, federal habeas corpus is available to state prisoners
to test claims that they are in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 5 In Fay v. Noia,6 the Court deliberately pressed habeas corpus jurisdiction to its outer limits, asserting that the writ is intended to provide:
a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to
be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized
society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary
for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown
of law, the indito conform with the fundamental requirements
7
vidual is entitled to his immediate release.
3. Compare, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977) and Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) with Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977) and
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977). See text accompanying notes 217-232 infra.
4. "[We have come a long way from the traditional notions of the Great Writ.
The common-law scholars of the past hardly would recognize what the Court has developed ... and they would, I suspect, conclude that it is not for the better." Braden
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 501 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131-34). The reaction to the scope of the
writ has several facets. First, there is the feeling that there are too many frivolous petitions which cast an unjustified burden on the district courts. See Bator, supra note 2,
at 506; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments,
38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 143-44 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?]. Second, there is the related feeling that the writ is being used as an adjunct
to the appellate process, although it was never intended for such use. See Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1974); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146
(1973); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). Third, there is the feeling,
unrelated to the issue of habeas corpus, that the Court has overextended the rights
which a defendant should be able to assert to avoid conviction. See, e.g., Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929 (1965). The
discomfort which the Court is experiencing with, for example, the rules of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1964), has led to
their limitation in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), and in United States v,
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). This discomfort also has led to a withdrawal of habeas
jurisdiction, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), or to its suggested withdrawal,
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,416-17 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508-09 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1970). Id. § 2254(a) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.
6. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
7. Id. at 401-02. In Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J.,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss2/2

2

1978]

Soloff: Litigation and
Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of Federal Habe
HABEAS CORPUS
FEDERAL

The Court in Noia held, as it had held in Brown v. Allen, 8 that the
writ must be available to test each substantive constitutional claim
raised by a state prisoner; 9 it went beyond Brown by removing
virtually all procedural bars to federal review. 10 Accordingly, after
dissenting), Justice Holmes stated that "habeas corpus ... goes to the very tissue of
the structure .. .and although every form may have been preserved [it] opens the
inquiry [into] whether they have been more than an empty shell." See also Wingo v.
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 468 (1974); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
8. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
9. In Noia the Court held that a state prisoner who had been convicted on the
basis of a concededly coerced confession was entitled to release notwithstanding his
failure to appeal his conviction for murder. He had exhausted his state remedies
because no further remedy was available to him at the time he sought the writ. Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-38 (1963). The adequate state ground of failure to appeal
did not bar habeas relief. Id. at 428-35. His failure to appeal was not a waiver of
review because of the "grisly choice" confronting him in that a successful appeal
could have resulted in a retrial and subsequent death penalty. He initially had been
sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 438-40. Prior to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976), the writ was available, absent any procedural bar, if any substantive right was
violated and if the alleged constitutional error was not found to be harmless. In Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), the Court held the admission of arguably
coerced confessions, in the context of that case, to be harmless if error at all. Stone
limited the substantive scope of the writ by withdrawing fourth amendment claims
from review where the prisoner has had an adequate opportunity to litigate his claim
in the state courts. See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 infra.
10. Procedurally, to secure relief, petitioner must allege facts which, if true,
would entitle him to release. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963). He must
show that he has exhausted his presently available state remedies. Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270 (1971); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). Prior to the decision in Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963), the exhaustion requirement included an application to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. Noia overruled the requirement of Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), that a state prisoner must apply for
certiorari before seeking habeas corpus. Fay v..Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-38 (1963).
This was a result of the Court's view that the district courts were better equipped
than the Supreme Court to evaluate state prisoners' claims in the first instance. See
text accompanying notes 16-18 infra. Prior to the 1977 decision in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977), habeas corpus relief was available even if the state
court had not passed on a claim, if the failure to do so was not by virtue of the
prisoner's own deliberate bypass of state remedies. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
See text accompanying notes 153-162 infra. Prior to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976), to the extent that the state courts had considered and rejected a claim, relief
was available in every case if the state courts were wrong on the law or if the state
factfinding process was not entitled to a presumption of correctness. Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). If
the former, the prisoner was entitled to the writ. A grant of the writ for constitutional
errors in state process generally entitles the prisoner to his release unless retried
within a period of time specified by the issuing court. A federal court is empowered
to "dispose of the matter as lav and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970). See
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). If the latter, he was entitled to a de novo
factual determination either at an evidentiary hearing, through the use of some other
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Noia, governmental accountability included accountability for correct results as determined by the last court empowered to review

the claim. In Kaufman v. United States, 11 the Court decided that
"adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief."1 2 Thus, even if a claim had been thoroughly litigated
once, a prisoner was entitled to have it relitigated, except in limited circumstances.13
It was the availability of substantive relitigation which provoked the sharpest adverse reaction. Numerous scholars decried
unending collateral attack on both state and federal judgments of
conviction and argued strongly for some principle of finality which
would halt what they viewed as the unnecessary, wasteful, even
4
damaging relitigation of constitutional claims.1

On the other hand, not only did a majority of the Court believe that a mechanism for relief should always be available to test
constitutional claims, but there was also considerable sentiment
that substantive review was even more necessary when constitutional claims were raised by state prisoners than when they were
raised by federal prisoners. 15 At least theoretically, certiorari was

method to develop the facts, or on the original record. Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63 (1977) (alternative methods for ascertaining facts); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.
286 (1969) (use of civil discovery devices); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)
(standards for de novo hearing). These procedures might or might not result in issuance of the writ, depending upon the result of the factfinding process. Prior to
Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977), while certiorari review might be precluded if there was- an' adequate and independent state ground for upholding the
conviction, such a ground did not bar habeas corpus relief. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), had overruled Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), in this respect, See text
accompanying notes 150-167 infra. See also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
Habeas corpus is not barred by statutes of limitations or by res judicata. Sanders v,
United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
11. 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Although Kaufman involved a petition for postconviction relief brought by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), the thrust
of the decision is that the scope of federal collateral review for state and federal prisoners is the same. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1969).
12. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226 (1969).
13. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
14. See Bator, supra note 2; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, supra note 4;
Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv.L. REv. 84 (1959). But see
Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U.
PA. L. REv. 461 (1960); Note, Developments in the Law: FederalHabeas Corpus, 83
HArry. L. REv. 1038 (1970).
15. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226 (1969). In Kaufman the Court
apparently agreed with the Governments argument that special concerns prompted
broad review of state judgments of conviction, although it disagreed with the Govern-
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available to test the claims of state prisoners directly on review of
the highest state court. 16 However, particularly with the rapid expansion of federal rights which the states were required to enforce,
this route was considered impracticable. 1 7 Moreover, a basic mis-

trust of the state courts' willingness and ability to perform adequately also prompted the Court to expand the availability of federal collateral review.'18
In its recent habeas cases, the Court has not consistently addressed these concerns, 19 nor has it supported its results in terms
of the functions to be served by the writ. Indeed, one of the most
striking features of recent habeas decisions is that, while the Court
still insists that it adheres to the general principle of a right to
substantive reitigation,2 0 it has recently narrowed federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction in three ways. First, the substantive scope of
the writ has been limited, 21 and there is the suggestion that it might
be further limited. 2 2 Second, its availability has been curtailed by
ment's position that these concerns were sufficient to support a more limited review
with respect to federal prisoners:
Support for this proposition [of more limited review of claims brought by
federal prisoners] is drawn from the fact that considerations which this
Court, in Fay v. Noia ... deemed justifications for affording a federal forum

to state prisoners-e.g., the necessity that federal courts have the "last say"
with respect to questions of federal law, the inadequacy of state procedures
to raise and preserve federal claims, the concern that state judges may be
unsympathetic to federally created rights, the institutional constraints on the
exercise of this Court's certiorari jurisdiction to review state convictions-do
not obtain with respect to federal prisoners.
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1969). Recognizing all this, the
Court nevertheless asserted: "The provision of federal collateral remedies rests more
fundamentally upon a recognition that adequate protection of constitutional rights
relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a
mechanism for relief." Id. at 226. Kaufman was overruled by Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976), insofar as Kaufman afforded collateral relief for fourth amendment
claims. See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 infra. The Court in Stone did not, however, confront Kaufman's view of the function of the writ.
16.

28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1970).

17. See, e.g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, supra note 4, at 155.
18. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. See also Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 350-51 (1974).
19. Apart from some general language that petitioner has a heavy burden to
justify collateral relief, Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1977), and an increased willingness to acknowledge state court abilities, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 493 n.35 (1976), the Court has not addressed the concerns discussed notes 14-18
supra.
20. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506-07 (1977).
21. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
22. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506 n.11 (1977); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 430
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a forfeiture standard which resurrects the adequate state ground
doctrine. 23 Third, the Court has taken a first step toward possibly
precluding habeas relief totally where the state has adequate postconviction process.2 4 Thus, while unwilling to abandon the principle of substantive relitigation, except in one area, 25 the Court
nevertheless has embarked on a course of decisions which makes
access to such relitigation more difficult in the first instance.26 In
view of the undeniable costs and questionable benefits of substantive relitigation, 27 it may be time to reconsider the idea of a continuously available "mechanism for relief."2 8 But any change should
focus on the concerns which underlie habeas corpus and should
take a consistent view of those concerns.
The extent to which, and the circumstances under which, federal habeas review of state court convictions should be available
have been in controversy since the Supreme Court began to expand habeas jurisdiction; thus, the issues involved in an expansion
or contraction of the writ have long been identified.2 9 The purpose
of this article is to show that recent developments in the law of habeas corpus have taken place with little or no regard for the
relevant issues and that a consistent, contemporary approach to the
problems engendered by federal review of claims brought by state
prisoners is both necessary and possible. 30
U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 419-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
23. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977). Under the adequate state

ground doctrine, a claim which the state courts have declined to consider because of
a nonconstitutional reason, such as a procedural default, has been held nonreviewable on federal habeas corpus. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953). Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963), specifically rejected the adequate state ground as a bar to habeas
corpus relief. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
24. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977), upheld the power of Congress to
sfeliminate the general availability of habeas corpus for the District of Columbia and
to substitute an adequate remedy to be used in the local District of Columbia courts.
Although the decision dealt only with the unique status of the District of Columbia,
it may have implications with respect to state prisoners. See text accompanying notes
245-255 infra.
25. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (fourth amendment cases).
26. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977).
27. See Bator, supra note 2; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?,supra note 4.
28. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226 (1969).
29. See, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Bator, supra note 2; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, supra note 4; Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REV.
1315 (1961); Note, Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 1038 (1970).

30. Judge Friendly, while approving the result in Stone, noted that he "would
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Until 1976, the Supreme Court adhered to the principle of
Fay v. Noia3 ' and Brown v. Allen. 3 2 In that year, however, the
Court imposed its first and, to date, its only substantive limitation
on the scope of habeas corpus. In Stone v. Powell,33 the Court decided that there would be no habeas review of fourth amendment
claims in cases in which the petitioner had had a full and fair opportunity to raise the issues in state courts. 3 4 Although at least
some members of the Court apparently would consider similar
treatment for claims arising under Miranda v. Arizona,3 5 and for
claims involving the pretrial right to counsel, 3 6 Stone has not yet
been extended.
Consequently, claims arising under the fourth amendment are
entitled to less federal consideration than are any other constitutional claims. But the Court has not articulated any theory relevant
to the purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction which justifies such a
ranking of constitutional rights. This absence of a rationale not only
makes it difficult to reconcile the past with the present, but also
makes it extremely difficult to predict the future. That is, with no
clear view of the way in which the Court perceives habeas corpus,
it cannot be said whether Stone represents a sui generis limitation
on review of fourth amendment claims; whether it has predictive
value for limiting habeas corpus to claims which cast doubt on the
guilt or innocence of the petitioner; whether it portends limiting
habeas corpus to claims which do not involve the enforcement of
"prophylactic" rules; or whether it suggests limiting habeas corpus
have preferred to have seen it reached by a thoroughgoing judicial reconsideration of
the whole subject of collateral attack on criminal convictions or, failing that, by legislation." Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1031 (1977). For an
approach to recent developments in federal habeas corpus different from that taken
herein, see Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
31. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
32. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
33. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
34. Id. at 481-82. See also id. at 494 n.37.
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506 n.11
(1977), the majority declined to consider the applicability of Stone to Miranda claims
because the issue had not been argued.
36. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the majority did not address the
applicability of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), to a claim of pretrial denial of
counsel. Justice Powell, concurring, declined to decide the issue because it had not
been raised. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger dissented and would have denied the writ because of Stone. Id.
at 426-27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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to claims arising from rights which have been held retroactively
applicable to cases decided before the announcing decision. Of all
these related possibilities, none deals with the concerns which have
heretofore governed the availability of the writ.
The principal judicial precursors of Stone are the dissenting
opinions in Kaufman v. United States37 and the concurring opinion
of Justice Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.38 Both of those
cases involved fourth amendment claims. In Kaufman the claim
was raised for the first time in an application for federal postconviction relief under Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States
Code. 39 Justice Black would have declined to consider a claim
either by way of section 2255 or by way of habeas corpus for state
prisoners40 unless the claim cast "some shadow of a doubt"4 1 on
petitioner's guilt. Justices Harlan and Stewart would have excepted
fourth amendment claims from collateral review, except in "limited
and special circumstances." 42 However, they disagreed with Justice
Black's thesis that reviewability should turn on guilt or innocence. 43 The entire Court seems to have agreed that the standards
for collateral review of federal convictions should be the same as
the standards for review of state convictions. But the dissenters
would have withdrawn relitigation of fourth amendment claims
from both federal and state postconviction review; 44 the majority
considered such review required for both classes of prisoners. 45
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,46 Justice Powell, concurring,
said that habeas corpus should not be available to test a claim
that illegally seized evidence should have been excluded from a
37. 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 242 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), is the postconviction remedy for federal prisoners.
It is coterminous with the relief available to state prisoners and has been held to be
a constitutionally adequate substitute for the writ. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S.
205 (1952).
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1970).
41. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 242 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The circumstances to which the opinion
refers, by citation to Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and to
Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
391-92 & n.60 (1964), largely involve inadequate counsel, or some other inadequacy
in the process by which the claim was determined. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217, 241 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
43. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 225-26.
46. 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell was joined
in his concurring opinion by the Chief Justice and by Justice Rehnquist.
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state trial unless petitioner had not had a fair opportunity to litigate
that question in the state courts. 47 Disposing of Noia as deriving
from a "revisionist view of the historic function" of the writ, 48 Justice Powell concluded that the value of finality of judgments was an
historic limitation on the scope of the writ, 49 and that although
"nlo one would now suggest that this Court be imprisoned by
every particular of habeas corpus as it existed in the late 18th and
19th centuries .. .recognition of that reality does not liberate us
from all historical restraint." 50
Justice Powell said that, typically, fourth amendment claims
have no bearing on the justice of incarceration. Thus, while habeas
corpus should be available for "added assurance" against unjust
incarceration, prisoners raising fourth amendment claims are generally justly detained. 51 He did not define what he meant by "added assurance" or further explain why such relitigation was necessary. His underlying premise, as had been Justice Black's, was that
justice is done when the guilty are convicted: A guilty person is
justly detained; evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is reliable and produces correct, that is, just, results.
Three years after Schneckloth, the Court decided Stone v.
Powell, 52 holding: "[W]here the State has provided an opportunity
for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal
habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." 53
In Stone there was a marked shift in emphasis from the concurrence in Schneckloth, notwithstanding that Justice Powell wrote
both opinions, and that the holding in Stone is a mirror image of
the language in the Schneckloth concurrence. 54 Where Schneckloth
47. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). The basic issue in Schneckloth was one of law:
the proper standard for evaluating whether or not consent to a search had been validly given. Id. at 219. The issue obviously was one of importance and could have
been decided on direct review of the state judgment of conviction. See text accompanying note 16 supra. But such relief was not sought and was not required to be
sought. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-38 (1963).
48. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 252 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 253-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 256 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,
380 n.13 (1977).
51. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
52. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
53. Id. at 482 (footnote omitted).
54. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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deals largely with habeas corpus, Stone deals largely with the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Gone is the resort to history
as demonstrating a need to temper the purposes of the writ; instead, the brief historical synopsis is intended to show that, until
Brown v. Allen and Fay v. Noia, the writ had developed to com-

pensate for the lack of adequate state corrective process. 55 Gone is
any reference to the value of finality; 56 relegated to a footnote is
the discussion of the costs of collateral review;57 transferred to an
analysis of the exclusionary rule itself is the discussion of the role of
guilt or innocence. 58 The opinion rejects the idea that effectuation
of the purposes of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule requires
the availability of habeas corpus. The Court concluded instead that
the exclusionary rule "is not a personal constitutional right. It is
not calculated to redress the injury .... "59
Justice Brennan, in dissent, refocused the issue on habeas corpus. 60 In his view, the Court must have been stating "either that
respondents [were] not, as a matter of statutory construction,'in
custody in violation of the Constitution,'

. .

. or that 'considerations

of comity and concern for the orderly administration of criminal
justice' . . . [were] sufficient to allow this Court to rewrite jurisdic-

tional statutes enacted by Congress." 6' Justice Brennan maintained:
However the Court reinterprets Mapp, and whatever the
rationale now attributed to Mapp's holding or the purpose ascribed to the exclusionary rule, the prevailing constitutional rule
is that unconstitutionally seized evidence cannot be admitted in
the criminal trial of a person whose federal constitutional rights
were violated by the search or seizure. The erroneous admission
55. Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-79 (1976) with Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 253-56 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
56. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256, 261-62 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
57. Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) with Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259-66 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
58. Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) with Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
59. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). By this analysis, the Court completely identified fourth amendment claims with the exclusionary rule. It thus left
virtually all fourth amendment claims without a federal collateral remedy, holding:
"[A] federal court need not apply the exclusionary rule on habeas review of a Fourth
Amendment claim absent a showing that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct review." Id. at
494 n.37.
60. Id. at 502 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 504-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 478 n.1).
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of such evidence is a violation of the Federal ConstitutionMapp inexorably means at least this much, or there would be no
basis for applying the exclusionary rule in state criminal proceedings ... .62
Since the majority acknowledged that the right not to be convicted
on the basis of fourth amendment violations still existed and could,
indeed, be invoked by way of certiorari, Justice Brennan could not
see how the "constitutional deprivation suddenly vanishes" 63 when
habeas jurisdiction is invoked; he stressed that Congress had effec64
tively cast the district courts as "surrogate Supreme Courts."Justice Brennan thus viewed the decision as having ominous
implications for the future of habeas corpus, especially because of
the majority's reliance on the irrelevance of fourth amendment violations to guilt or innocence. 65 He was concerned about the future
availability of habeas for a whole range of constitutional claims that
are not " 'guilt-related.' "66
The majority opinion described this portion of the dissent as
"hyperbole." 67 The majority did not, however, clearly indicate the
possible scope of Stone. The most limited interpretation of the decision, that it will not be expanded beyond fourth amendment situations, finds some support in that, until Stone, the only suggestions
for substantive limitations on habeas corpus were made in fourth
amendment cases. 68 The Stone rationale, that the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule "is not a personal constitutional right,"6 9 reinforces this interpretation.
If this is the basis of Stone, it tells much more about the future of the exclusionary rule than about the future scope of habeas
corpus. The exclusionary rule is, at last, "neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus," 70 but the surgery appears deliberately limited.
This is not, I suspect, because Justice Powell and at least the two
other members of the Court who had joined his Schneckloth con-

62. Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Among such claims, Justice Brennan
listed double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and use
of invalid identification procedures. Id. at 517-18 & n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 494-95 n.37.
68. See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
69. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
70. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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currence would not have preferred a broader approach, 71 but because not enough members of the Court were willing to deal with
the broader habeas problems. This seems to be the only sound
explanation for the striking difference between the Schneckloth
concurrence and Stone. The differences between them, as well as
the failure, thus far, of the proponents of the extension of Stone to
muster a majority of the Court to their position, 72 indicate that
Stone was not intended to set a trend for habeas corpus.
Even construed as a single substantive limitation on habeas
corpus, Stone is hard to comprehend. As long as it remains true
that the Constitution forbids convicting a defendant on the basis of
illegally seized evidence, a person so convicted is held in custody
in violation of the Constitution. As such, he is entitled to federal
review of his constitutional claims by way of habeas corpus. 73 This
is so until and unless the Court determines that, as a general matter, adequate state process is sufficient to bar relitigation of constitutional claims. 7 4 The substantive distinction drawn by the Court
simply fails to further the purposes of the writ.
The lack of adequate justification for singling out one constitutional provision for different treatment tends to exert some pressure to develop a broader rule. Possible bases for such a rule can
be discerned not only in Stone and its precursors, but also in
Brewer v. Williams 75 and Wainwright v. Sykes. 76 However, the possible lines of argument which emerge from these cases appear
71. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
72. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), which involved a claim that the
right to counsel before trial had been violated, the majority did not even advert to
the possible extension of Stone. The Chief Justice would have relied on Stone to
deny relief, id. at 419-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and Justice Powell would, in an
appropriate case, have considered its extension to fifth and sixth amendment claims,
id. at 413-14 (Powell, J., concurring). In Justice Powell's view, however, Brewer was
not such a case because the parties had not had the opportunity to brief the issue, id.
at 414 & n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
507-09 & n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting), which involved alleged discrimination in
grand jury selection. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506 n. 1 (1977), which
involved a Miranda claim, the Court declined to reach the applicability of Stone
because this issue had not been raised by the parties.
73. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1970).
74. One of the principal suggestions with respect to habeas corpus is that there
should be no substantive relitigation of any claims unless state process has been
found inadequate to deal with them. See Bator, supra note 2; Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant?, supra note 4. See also text accompanying note 238 infra.
75. 430 U.S. 387, 416-17 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Id. at 409-11, 413 n.2
(Powell, J., concurring).
76. 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506 n.11 (1977).
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to have as little to do with the rationale of habeas corpus as does
Stone itself.
The Role of Guilt or Innocence
One dominant theme in fourth amendment cases is that since
fourth amendment violations do not bear any relation to the reliability of the guilt-determining process, and since the victims of
such violations are nearly always guilty, habeas corpus should not
lie to evaluate claimed violations. 77 Justice Black's position in
Kaufman v. United States78 was that the claim should not be heard
unless it casts some "shadow of a doubt"79 on the defendant's guilt,
80
equating, as did Justice Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
justice with conviction of the guilty.
But this simple equation is antithetical to the concept that the
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment set standards for official conduct irrespective of guilt or innocence.8 l While some constitutional provisions have been held applicable to the states because
the rights they embody are believed necessary to assure reliable
factfinding,8 2 this is by no means true of all provisions which have
been held binding on the states.83 That is, the decision to make
certain enumerated rights applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment did not always depend on the contribution
which enforcement of these rights would make to the determination of guilt or innocence. The principal purposes of such incorporation are to require the states to enforce these fundamental rights
and to insure their consistent enforcement. This can be achieved

77.

Several members of the Court have recently expressed an inclination to

focus the habeas corpus inquiry on whether or not the alleged violation could have
resulted in an incorrect verdict. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1

(1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 507 (Stewart, J., dissenting). But see Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413 n.2 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). While this approach

basically would limit the scope of review, at least one Justice is prepared to follow the
approach to its logical conclusion and to consider if the evidence at trial was sufficient
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This would represent an unprecedented
expansion of the scope of the writ. Freeman v. Zahradnick, 97 S.Ct. 1150, 1152 (1977)
(Stewart, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
78. 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 242 (Black, J., dissenting).
80. 412 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
81. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 524-25 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)

(citing cases).
82. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at
trial).
83. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial).
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only by federal review. Consequently, any withdrawal of direct review would be inconsistent with the purposes of incorporation. To
the extent that collateral review provides surrogate certiorari review and provides it for far more cases than could be reviewed
directly, withdrawal of collateral review is also inconsistent with
the purposes of incorporation.
The role which guilt or innocence might play in defining the
scope of habeas corpus review for claims brought by state prisoners is limited at best.84 If the underlying premise of the scope
of collateral review is that a mechanism should be continuously
available to relitigate constitutional claims, 8 5 then innocence is irrelevant. That is, if the right is enforceable in the first instance irrespective of its bearing on guilt or innocence, the rationale of relitigation requires that it remain enforceable. Thus, in this context, to
the extent that the guilt-innocence inquiry equates justice only
with "correct" results and pays no attention to the means used
to secure those results, it is too narrow.
If, on the other hand, the underlying premise of the scope of
collateral review is that there should be no relitigation of claims
which have been fully and fairly litigated,8 6 even if only in the state
courts, then the colorable claim of innocence acts as a kind of judicial safety valve. It allows relitigation even though the underlying
process appears adequate because of some perception that the
wrong result has been reached. In this context, the idea is expansive rather than restrictive.
Indeed, it was precisely in this context that Judge Friendly
suggested the relevance of a colorable claim of innocence to the
availability of collateral attack. 8 7 He took the position that collateral
attack "carries a serious burden of justification" 8 8 which can be met
only in four types of cases. 89 The underlying principle is that, in all
84. Justice Black was an early Supreme Court proponent of the relevance of
guilt or innocence to collateral attack. See text accompanying note 41 supra. The idea
found its most scholarly presentation in the 1970 article by Judge Friendly, see
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?,supra note 4.
85. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
87. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?,supra note 4.
88. Id. at 146-49. Judge Friendly addressed himself principally to collateral attack in a unitary system, that is, a single state or federal system. Id. at 146. However,
he ultimately concluded that the same principles which he believed should govern a
unitary system should also govern where federal relief is sought against a state conviction. Id. at 167.
89. These are cases in which (1) the criminal process has broken down to the
extent that the court can be said to have lost jurisdiction; (2) a denial of rights is
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of these areas, a violation would mean that petitioner had not had
one fair opportunity to litigate the charges. Where there had been
such an opportunity, Judge Friendly did not believe that the claim
should be relitigated "in the absence of a colorable showing of innocence": 9 0
[T]he petitioner for collateral attack must show a fair probability
that, in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have
been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability
of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly
excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the
trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of
his guilt. 91
Even where the basic premise of the scope of the writ makes
the question of innocence expansive rather than restrictive, there
are serious difficulties with its applicability. Presumably a "colorable claim of innocence" means something other than harmless
error since Judge Friendly, at least, would include in the evaluation any evidence which, it is claimed, should have been
excluded. 92 But, if state process has been adequate, the verdict
would seem to be the last thing which should be relitigated. Certainly, going behind verdicts would aggravate, not reduce, federalstate tension. Workload would not be appreciably lessened because, unless courts were to begin to construe petitions very
strictly, someone would have to read the state records to evaluate
the evidence and the colorability of the claim of innocence. In
short, examining whether there is a colorable claim of innocence is
more, not less, intrusive; it is at least as time-consuming as the
present practice. Yet the principal rationale of a system which
would limit relitigation to cases in which there has been a failure of
claimed on the basis of facts outside the record and, hence, this denial could not
have been directly reviewed; (3) there has been a failure to provide proper procedure for defending at trial and on appeal; (4) new constitutional developments relating to criminal procedure apply. Id. at 151-54.
90. Id. at 142.
91. Id. at 160 (footnote omitted). Judge Friendly believed that this proposal
would almost always preclude collateral attack on claims of illegal search and seizure
and on Miranda claims, but not on claims that confessions are "involuntary in the
pre-Miranda sense," at least where there was no other substantial evidence of guilt.
Id. at 161-64.
92. Error is harmless in a constitutional sense when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that "the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
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process is to limit intrusiveness and to avoid needless expenditure
of resources. 93

The Integrity of the Factfinding Process
In Stone the Court declined to extend the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule to habeas corpus 94 because, among other things,
it does not relate to the integrity of the factfinding process. It does
not, by its nature, affect the reliability of the verdict. 95 This is
different from, although related to, the "colorable claim of innocence" approach. But this concept, too, has nothing to do with the
announced purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction.
The integrity of the factfinding process touchstone derives
from the cases dealing with the retroactivity of newly announced
rules. 96 Cases announcing new rules which are held necessary for
reliable determinations of guilt or innocence are typically held retroactive. 97 Cases in which the integrity of the factfinding process is
not impugned typically are held prospective only, notwithstanding
that they, too, deal with constitutional rights. 98 Except for the new
approach taken by the Court in Stone, it has always been the case
that once the right is announced and has attached, it becomes enforceable by way of habeas corpus. 99
The retroactivity-prospectivity distinction, which was criticized
sharply from its inception as analytically indefensible,100 developed
as a response to problems unrelated to habeas review. If numbers
of new rights were to be held applicable to the states, and if those
rights were to be held retroactive, the states would spend enormous time and resources relitigating the past and, perhaps, release
people adjudged guilty by reliable processes.' 0 ' If the alternative
to prospectivity were not to extend the right at all, the Court was
unwilling to pay the price. This judicial compromise has resulted in
holding retroactive only a very limited number of new rights: the
93.

See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.

94. See text accompanying note 111 infra.
95.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1976).

96. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
97. See, e.g., Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (confrontation).
98. See, e.g., DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (jury trial); Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (Miranda warnings); Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (privilege against self-incrimination).
99. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 644 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
101. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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right to counsel at trial, 102 the right to confront witnesses, 10 3 the
right not to have a jury consider a coerced confession,' 4 and10 the
5
right not to be tried in violation of the double jeopardy clause.
On the other hand, some of the most basic principles of the
Anglo-American system of criminal justice have been held not to
apply retroactively to the states, including the privilege against
self-incrimination'0 6 and the right to a jury trial. 10 7 However, if the
direct review process failed to remedy any violation of these rights,
there is no question that the present Court would consider a
petitioner entitled to habeas review of the claims on their merits.
In short, the retroactivity cases developed as a result of considerations having nothing to do with the availability of federal review.
The distinctions which they draw bear no relation to enforcing a
right once it is held applicable, at least if the Court is adhering to its
belief in continuously available review. That is, if a claim involves
the integrity of the factfinding process, but the state has adequately
considered it, there is no more compelling reason to relitigate it
than there is to relitigate other claims. If the concerns which led to
broad habeas review are still legitimate, 10 8 there is no less compelling reason to relitigate one sort of constitutional claim than there
is to relitigate another.
The Prophylactic Rules
Another possible extension of Stone would be to cases in
which the only claimed violation is of so-called "prophylactic"
rules, 10 9 rules of conduct which the Court has announced to secure
underlying rights. 110 The term "prophylactic" is, indeed, a term of
102. Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
103. See, e.g., Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
104. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
105. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436
(1970); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
106. See Mackay v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); Tehan v. United States

ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
107. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
108. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
109. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). However, in Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482 (1977), Justice Powell's dissent suggested that Stone might be extended to
other classes of cases. The issue involved in Castaneda was discrimination in grand
jury selection. Justice Powell declined to address the question because it had not
been briefed or argued. Id. at 508 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
110. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule has been described as a
"prophylactic device." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976) (quoting Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969)). The warnings required by Miranda v.
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denigration and its use reflects the Court's ambivalence toward the
rules themselves rather than any view of the proper scope of
habeas corpus.
It is simply incorrect to speak, as the Court did in Stone, of
"extending""'- a prophylactic, generally an exclusionary, rule to
habeas corpus. The issue in habeas corpus is not whether, for
example, illegally seized evidence may be used in the habeas corpus proceeding itself. The issue is whether such evidence was used
in a prior proceeding where the Constitution forbade its use. This
issue is in sharp contrast to the issue in cases such as United States
v. Calandra,112 in which the Court stated, correctly or incorrectly,
that the Constitution is not violated by the use of illegally seized
evidence in a proceeding other than a trial. Thus, the Court did not
extend the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the grand
jury. 113 But Stone involved the use of allegedly illegally seized evidence at trial and that is, so far, a violation of the Constitution. 11 4
The reluctance of the Court to extend prophylactic rules to
habeas corpus appears to stem from an ambivalent attitude toward
the continued use of such rules at all, as shown by an increasing
reluctance to enforce them literally. This is clear not only from the
Court's treatment of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule" 5 but
also from its Miranda decisions 116 and its identification decisions. 117 A major reason for this reluctance is the inescapable fact
that violation of a rule does not necessarily mean violation of the
right it was designed to protect. If a rule does not relate to guilt or
innocence, and if noncompliance does not even mean that a protected right has been violated, it becomes extremely difficult to
justify per se enforcement of the rule." 8
It is possible that some or all prophylactic rules should be recast or abandoned." 9 But the problems raised by their current
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), have also been described as prophylactic, Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974). The rule of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), requiring a judge to state in writing his reasons for imposing a higher sentence after retrial, has also been described as prophylactic, Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21, 26 (1974).
111. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489 (1976).
112. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
113. Id. at 350.
114. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976).
115. See id. at 493-94.
116. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
117. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
118. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
119. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536-42 (1976) (White, J., dissent-

ing).
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status are not solved by continuing to require adherence to them
and then, for all practical purposes, refusing to allow their federal
enforcement. If substantive relitigation is necessary because of the
inadequacy of certiorari review and the inadequacy of state resolution, 120 then it is necessary for all constitutionally protected claims.
If prophylactic rules are necessary to protect constitutional
rights, 12 1 then their enforcement is a federal function as much as is
the enforcement of the rights they were designed to protect.
An Alternative Approach
The possible limitations on review of substantive claims by
way of federal habeas corpus all suffer from a failure to address
themselves to the purposes of the writ. Distinctions based on guilt
or innocence, on the reliability of the factfinding process, or on
enforcement of prophylactic rules have, in fact, nothing to do with
whether or not collateral attack should be available, but rather
with whether federal review should be available at all for state prisoners who have had their claims considered by the state courts.
The difficulty with adopting any one of the proposed limitations is
that, in any given case, it might not insure justice in a constitutional
22

sense. 1

The Court, or at least some of its members, seems to be
searching for a rationale for review which will preserve broad substantive review for the federal courts while insuring against results
which it perceives to be unjust. In this respect, it does not appear
to be searching for a rationale for habeas corpus different from a
rationale for its direct review of state court judgments. To the extent
that Stone distinguishes between the scope of direct and collateral
review of claims brought by state prisoners, it is inconsistent with
this search, it is at odds with the idea that habeas corpus functions
to provide surrogate certiorari review, and it circumvents the real
problem which is continued per se enforcement of prophylactic
rules.
Accordingly, if there are to be any changes in the scope of
substantive review, such changes should not be accomplished by
carving indefensible exceptions from the habeas purview. Rather,
the changes should be the same for both direct and collateral review
120. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
121. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).
122. Adoption of any one of these limitations might not result in enforcement of
a right which the Court has held fundamental and binding on the states. See text
accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
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and should utilize a due process analysis. That is, in each case federal review would address the nature of the underlying right, the
nature of the conduct alleged to have violated that right, and the
consequences of the alleged violation. This approach avoids the
"draconian' 123 results of per se enforcement of exclusionary rules
while protecting the underlying right. Depending upon the right
involved, this approach may or may not take account of the impact
of the violation on the reliability of the guilt-determining process;
it should not, in any event, depend on a reviewing court's perception of guilt. The due process standard simply harmonizes the
scope of substantive review with the need to enforce the underlying
right.
This, indeed, appears to be the approach taken by the Court
in the identification cases.1 24 In the initial trilogy of identification
cases, United States v. Wade, 125 Gilbert v. California, 26 and Stovall v. Denno,'1 27 the Court required that counsel be available at
lineups. However, it declined to say that an in-court identification
could not be made if the rule with respect to counsel had been
violated. It decided instead that the permissibility of the in-court
identification would be determined by an analysis of all factors surrounding the prior identification to determine whether the identification was so tainted that the jury should not even have been per128
mitted to evaluate it.

Last Term, the Court adhered to and refined this approach. In
Manson v. Brathwaite,129 a habeas corpus case, the Court considered the circumstances under which identification testimony could
be offered at trial where the right to counsel was not involved. The
state conceded that the pretrial identification procedure was " 'suggestive [because only one photograph was used] and unnecessary
[because there was no emergency or exigent circumstance].' "130
The Court said that two approaches to such cases had developed.
123. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977).
124. This also appears to be a developing trend in Miranda cases. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). It is the traditional approach in dealing with
nonenumerated rights or rights not involving prophylactic rules. See, e.g., Donnelly
v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
125. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
126. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
127. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
128. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-43 (1967). See also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
129. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
130. Id. at 108.
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The first was a per se rule requiring exclusion of such evidence
"without regard to reliability." 1 31 The second approach
continues to rely on the totality of the circumstances. It permits the admission of the confrontation evidence if, despite the
suggestive aspect, the out-of-court identification possesses certain
features of reliability. .

.

.This second approach . . .serves to

limit the societal costs imposed by a sanction that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and evaluation by the trier of
32
fact.X
Adopting this second approach, the Court denied relief because evaluation of the circumstances resulted in a finding that the evidence
133
was reliable and that its admission did not violate due process.
In Manson the Court not only moved away from per se rules
in the identification area but also it signaled some effort to subsume such rules within a due process analysis. 134 If the Court can
do this in the identification area, there seems to be no reason not
to take the same approach, for example, in the Miranda1 3 5 and
fourth amendment areas. 136 In cases involving the warnings set
131.

Id. at 110.

132. Id.
Id. at 117.
134. The Court noted: "Certainly, inflexible rules of exclusion, that may frus133.

trate rather than promote justice, have ,not been viewed recently by this Court with
unlimited enthusiasm." Id. at 113 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)).
135. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Apparently, it was of no significance to the Court that Manson arose on habeas rather than on direct review since
the Court nowhere addresses the distinction.
136. The problem and the danger lie in the components of the totality of the
circumstances analysis. That is, in Manson the Court indicated that "reliability is the
linchpin." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). Since the underlying
rationale for exclusion of eyewitness identification has always been reliability, this
characterization may be appropriate. But in fourth and fifth amendment cases, reliability is not the principal value being served and a too ready transfer of the concept of reliability to those areas as the linchpin would distort their purpose. The
touchstone of reliability relates to the inclination to limit habeas corpus to issues
affecting the determination of guilt or innocence. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. However, even Justice Powell, the most consistent proponent of this view,
was unable to adhere to it in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 409 (1977) (Powell,
J., concurring). In this case, where no doubt was expressed as to the accuracy of the
verdict or the manner in which it was reached, Justice Powell pointed out that while
he might be inclined to extend Stone to other classes of cases,
[h]ere, we have a Sixth Amendment case and also one in which the police
deliberately took advantage of an inherently coercive setting in the absence
of counsel, contrary to their express agreement. Police are to be commended
for diligent efforts to ascertain the truth, but the police conduct in this case
plainly violated respondent's constitutional rights.
Id. at 413 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
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forth in Miranda v. Arizona,137 the inquiry might center on what,
if any, information was conveyed and its impact on the waiver of
the privilege against self-incrimination, rather than on whether
there was strict technical compliance. In fourth amendment cases,
the good faith of the officers and the nature of their conduct would
seem more important than technical perfection. It is, after all, difficult to sympathize with exclusion of the evidence in Stone v.
Powell. 138 It is equally difficult not to sympathize with exclusion in
Mapp v. Ohio. 139
PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS:
THE ADEQUATE STATE GROUND

The question of the ends to be served by federal habeas corpus review of state convictions has received no more consideration
in the Court's recent procedural decisions than it has in its substantive decisions. As a result, in the past two Terms the Court has
decided several cases involving procedural problems 140 indifferent
ways. It has, however, scarcely touched the habeas questions involved.
In theory, the issue whether habeas corpus should be available
to a state prisoner may arise where (1) state courts have been asked
to consider and have considered a claim and it is alleged that they
reached the wrong result; 141 (2) state courts have been asked to
137. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
138. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
139. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Stone it would be difficult to say that any officer
acted in bad faith or knowingly invaded anyone's rights; the postarrest determinations of warrant invalidity and statutory invalidity resulted in findings that the fourth
amendment had been violated although the officers had done all they could. By contrast, in Mapp officers invaded and ransacked a house, apparently lying to its occupant about their authority to search. This "capital punishment" application of the
exclusionary rule, which requires the same sanction for every infringement, Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), is one of its severest drawbacks. See also Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1964).
140. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.
145 (1977); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
141. This first situation poses no procedural bars to federal review of constitutional claims but relates solely to the scope of substantive review. And, notwithstanding the result in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and the signals in Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977), the Court still insists that Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953), is the law and that a prisoner has a right to have his constitutional claims
tested on the merits by a federal court. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2507
(1977). Although the Court initially assumed that it was "the typical, not the rare,
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consider and have considered a claim and it is asserted that they
have done so inadequately; 142 (3) state courts have never been
asked to consider a claim; 14 3 and, (4) state courts have been asked
to consider a claim and have refused to do so. 14
By far the most dramatic procedural development in habeas
corpus since Fay v. Noia145 was the decision in Wainwright v.
Sykes. 146 In Sykes the Court held that failure to comply with state

rules of trial procedure which would bar state consideration of a
claim will also bar federal review absent a showing of both "cause"
and "prejudice. "147 Essentially, this is a determination that where a
legitimate state interest in procedural rules bars state consideration
of a claim, that same interest should preclude federal litigation.
Thus, the Court has resurrected the adequate state ground 14 8 which
it rejected in Noia and has substituted it for the waiver analysis

mandated by that decision. 149

case in which constitutional claims turn upon the resolution of contested factual issues," Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), the overwhelming number of
habeas cases are decided on the state court records. This is certainly true for the
habeas cases which ultimately reach the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973); Mancusi v.
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). District court hearings
were held in far fewer cases which reached the Court, see, e.g., Boulden v. Holman,
394 U.S. 478 (1969); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1966).
142. This would generally be an assertion that federal factfinding is required,
see, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). This second situation presents the
only possible basis which now exists for securing federal review of fourth amendment claims, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), as well as the basis for overcoming the presumption of correctness attached to state findings of fact in all other
substantive areas. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970).
143. The immediate inquiry here is whether or not petitioner has exhausted his
presently available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). See Picard v. Conner,
404 U.S. 270 (1971). For a person to be barred by the exhaustion requirement, a state
remedy must be available at the time habeas relief is sought. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 435 (1963). If petitioner has exhausted state remedies, the inquiry then would
be whether he has waived the right to have a federal court consider his claim. Id. at
438-40.
144. The inquiry here is whether the refusal is grounded in some failure to
comply with state procedural rules and the weight to be given to this failure. Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977) with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963).
145. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
146. 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977).
147. Id. at 2506.
148. See note 23 supra.
149. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506 (1977). See text accompanying
notes 153-167 infra.
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The problem of procedural bars to habeas corpus had its modem genesis in the several cases reviewed in Brown v. Allen.'150
One petitioner, having pursued his claims through the state courts
and having had them decided on the merits, was entitled to federal
collateral review. 151 Another, having filed his appeal one day out of
time, was not so entitled since his conviction was then held to rest
on' an adequate and independent state ground. 152 The result was a
striking anomaly: Although the underlying claims were identical,
the first petitioner was entitled to have his constitutional claim considered by both state and federal courts; the second petitioner was
not entitled to have it considered at all.
This anomaly was largely dispelled by Noia. In that case the
habeas petitioner had been convicted of murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment. He did not appeal his judgment of conviction
because of his fear that, on retrial, he would be sentenced to
death. His conviction rested on a concededly coerced confession. 15 3
The state courts denied collateral relief because the issue was one
which should have been raised on appeal from the judgment of
conviction. 154 The Second Circuit reversed a denial of habeas corpus on the ground that "exceptional circumstances" existed. 155 The
Supreme Court affirmed but on different and far more sweeping
grounds. The Court held that state remedies had been exhausted
because, at the time of the habeas application, there was no state
remedy available to petitioner.' 56 Since there were no presently
available state remedies to which the federal courts should defer,
petitioner was entitled to federal review of the merits of his con5 7
stitutional claim unless he had deliberately waived that claim.1
The Court noted that, while interests of federalism require initial
deference to the states, ultimate responsibility for correct results
150. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
151. Id. at 466-77.
152. Id. at 486-87. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.

153. Noia's codefendants were successful in having their confessions adjudged
coerced. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896
(1955); People v. Bonino, 1 N.Y.2d 752, 135 N.E.2d 51, 152 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1956). The
state acknowledged that Noia's confession had been obtained under the same circumstances as were Caminito's and Bonino's, but insisted on holding Noia to his procedural default, his failure to appeal.
154. People v. Noia, 4 App. Div. 2d 698, 163 N.Y.S.2d 796 (2d Dep't 1957),
affd sub nom. People v. Caminito, 3 N.Y.2d 596, 148 N.E.2d 139, 170 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 905 (1959).
155. United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 372
U.S. 391 (1963).
156. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963).
157. Id.
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lies in the federal courts.' 58 Since sheer volume precludes the Supreme Court from assuming this responsibility, the lot falls to the
district courts to do so in the first instance, subject to review by the
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. 159
The opinion rejected the adequate state ground as a bar to
habeas relief, holding it applicable only in cases of direct review,' 60
but inappropriate where the issue is unconscionable detention.' 6 '
In short, Noia found no procedural bar to habeas review unless
deliberate bypass were proved by the state. 162 This strict standard
seemed to apply to any procedural limitation which prevented review of a constitutional claim, including failures to move to suppress, 16 3 failures to object at trial, 1 64 and failures to appeal. 165 Es-

sentially, the rationale was that a fundamental right was at issue,
such as the right not to be convicted on the basis of a coerced
confession, and that right could be lost only if personally waived by
the defendant 66 under the strict waiver standard enunciated in
67
Johnson v. Zerbst.1
Immediately, this idea met lower federal court resistance,
especially with regard to objections which could have been and
were not made at trial, and where petitioner was represented by
counsel whose competence he did not challenge. 16 8 Since federal
and state courts are bound by the same standard of waiver, and
since a failure to object is a typical bar to federal appellate relief,169
it was hard for federal courts to accept the idea that they must
always look behind the failure to object at trial to ascertain the
availability of collateral relief.
Two years after Noia, the Court decided Henry v. Missis158.

Id. at 415-26.

159.

Id. at 436-37.

160.

Id. at 428-34.

161.

Id.

162.
"waiver."
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 433. "Deliberate bypass" was used by the Court synonymously with
Id. at 438-39.
See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

166. Id. at 438-39.
167.

304 U.S. 458 (1938). "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment

or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464.
168. See, e.g., Whitney v. United States, 413 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Terry v. Henderson, 462 F.2d 1125 (2d Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Green v. Rundle, 452 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Cruz v. LaVallee,
448 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1971).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966).
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sippi.1 70 In that case, counsel had failed to comply with a contemporaneous objection rule and, therefore, had not preserved a claim
that illegally seized evidence had been admitted at trial. 17 1 The
case went to the Supreme Court not on habeas corpus but on direct review and was remanded to the state for a hearing "on the
question whether the petitioner [was] to be deemed to have knowingly waived decision of his federal claim when timely objection
was not made." 1 72 The opinion distinguished between substantive
and procedural state grounds as bases for limiting direct federal review. It held that where the state ground alleged to bar relief was
substantive, the adequate state ground doctrine was necessary to
avoid advisory opinions. But that was not true where the state
ground was "purely procedural":1

73

A procedural default which is held to bar challenge to a conviction in state courts, even on federal constitutional grounds, prevents implementation of the federal right. Accordingly, we have
consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question ....

[A]

litigant's procedural defaults in state proceedings do not prevent
vindication of his federal rights unless the State's insistence on
compliance with its procedural rule serves a legitimate state interest. In every case we must inquire whether the enforcement
of a procedural forfeiture serves such a state interest. If it does
not, the state procedural rule ought not be permitted to bar vindication of important federal rights.174
In a footnote to this passage, the Court added:
This will not lead inevitably to a plethora of attacks on the
application of state procedural rules; where the state rule is a
reasonable one and clearly announced to defendant and counsel,
application of the waiver doctrine will yield the same result as
that of the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine in the vast majority of cases. 175
The Court then declined to determine the adequacy of the state
ground because, even assuming it to be inadequate, the record
suggested a possible waiver by counsel,1 76 and
170.

379 U.S. 443 (1965).

171. Id. at 445-46.
172.

Id. at 446.

173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447-48 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 448 n.3.
Id. at 450.
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[a]lthough trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional
claims . . . we think that the deliberate bypassing by counsel of

as a part of trial strategy
the contemporaneous-objection rule
177
would have that effect in this case.
The decision by the Court in Henry to remand on the question
of waiver left the relationship between direct and collateral review
unclear. Henry might be read to mean that habeas corpus would be
available where direct federal review was unavailable. This reading
would flow from the Court's assumption, in remanding, that the
state ground was inadequate. The Court said that if the state found
no waiver, it could still insist on enforcing its procedural rule, but
that the federal courts could consider the claim on habeas corpus if, in
1 78
fact, it had not been waived.
The implication is that direct review would be unavailable, although that implication virtually nullifies the Court's painstaking
differentiation between substantive and procedural state grounds
and between legitimate and inadequate state interests. If a state's
adherence to its procedural rules will, in any event, bar relief,
there seems no reason to analyze those rules in any given case. If,
indeed, the Court meant that habeas would be available where direct review is not, that result is indefensible. If a principal purpose
of habeas corpus for state prisoners is surrogate certiorari review, 1 79 there appears to be no reason for collateral attack to be
more readily available than direct federal review. Moreover, since
a result is not definite until the Supreme Court has reviewed or
declined to review a claim, or the time within which to request
review has passed, preventing one more step while encouraging
0
three is certainly counterproductive. 18
Another unclear aspect of Henry is the relationship between
adequate state ground and waiver. The Court in Henry expected
that application of either doctrine in any case was likely to produce
the same results. 181 However, a reading of the opinion as a whole
177. Id. at 451-52 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 452-53.
179. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. The defendant who was barred by an adequate state ground could not
seek relief directly from the Supreme Court but could seek habeas corpus and, if
necessary, appeal its denial. Finally, he could seek Supreme Court review of an
unsuccessful appeal.
181. See text accompanying note 175 supra.
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raises the possibility that in Henry itself a defendant could be held
to have waived a right under a rule which the state had no legitimate interest in enforcing. 1 82 Moreover, the Court did not suggest
that the issue of waiver was directly reviewable, although waiver of
federal rights is a federal question.
Noia never satisfactorily explained why a rule which the state
had a legitimate interest in enforcing on direct review should lose
that force collaterally. Henry never satisfactorily explained why the
Court should be bound on direct review by a rule which the state
had no legitimate interest in enforcing.
In Wainwright v. Sykes,' 8 3 the Court rejected Noia and made
direct and collateral review standards the same, but it based those
standards on the adequate state ground doctrine and not on
waiver. 1 8 4 In Sykes respondent claimed only after trial that testimony was admitted in violation of his Miranda rights. The state
courts had refused to consider the claim on the merits because of
respondent's failure to comply with the state's contemporaneous
objection rule. 18 5 The Court addressed the issue of the circumstances under which an adequate state ground would bar relief.'8 6 Canvassing prior cases, the Court said:
To the extent that the dicta of Fay v. Noia may be thought
to have laid down an all-inclusive rule rendering state timely
objection rules ineffective to bar review of underlying federal
claims in federal habeas proceedings-absent a "knowing waiver"
or a "deliberate bypass" of the right to so object-its effect was
limited by Francis .... 187
The limitation on Noia which the Court relied upon was Francis v.
Henderson,' 88 decided the previous Term. Francis, in turn, rested
on Davis v. United States,'8 9 a case brought pursuant to section
182.

In Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2504 n.8 (1977), the Court indi-

cated that waiver is itself an adequate state ground. Inasmuch as waiver has always
been considered a federal question, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963), it is difficult to see how it can be denominated an adequate state ground.
183. 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
184. Id. at 2507. In adopting the adequate state ground which already applied
on direct review, Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), the Court equated the
standards for direct and collateral review.
185. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2500 (1977).
186. Id. at 2503.
187. Id. at 2505.
188. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
189. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
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2255.190 In Davis the Court had held that a federal prisoner who
had failed to make timely challenge to the composition of a grand
jury could not do so by collateral attack. 19 1 In Francis the issue was
whether a state prisoner who had failed to make timely challenge
to the grand jury composition could secure habeas corpus relief, or
whether the Davis rule applied to state cases. 19 2 The Court upheld
a statutorily imposed waiver because the interest in having the

issue timely raised was as strong for state as for federal courts and
because considerations of comity and federalism required the same

result. 193 To overcome the waiver, defendant would have to show

cause for the failure to raise the claim and would also have to show

actual prejudice. 194
In applying the Francis rule to waived objections to confessions, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, 195 the Court in

Sykes relied on a decision which had simply served to equate federal and state collateral review. Thus, in rejecting Noia, the Court
did not consider any of the special circumstances which have been
thought to underlie habeas jurisdiction. Moreover, Sykes recreated
the anomaly which had existed prior to Noia. 1 96 It upheld the rule
of Brown v. Allen 1 97 that, once a state claim had been litigated, a

federal court should independently determine the correctness of
the result, but it barred claims which had not been litigated absent
a showing of cause and prejudice. It declined to define that term
except to state that it was narrower than the Noia deliberate bypass
doctrine. '
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
191. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973).
192. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 537 (1976).
193. Id. at 541-42.
194. Id. at 542. The only reference to Noia in the majority opinion in Francis
was in support of the proposition that the Court had the power to entertain the claim
on its merits. Id. at 539.
195. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506 (1977).
196. See text accompanying notes 150-153 supra. The most recent illustration of
the anomaly is seen by comparing Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), with
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In Francis defendant was held to have
waived his right to challenge the composition of the grand jury in the state courts
and, thus, was barred from federal consideration of that claim. Accordingly, he never
received a substantive review of that issue in any court. In Castaneda the state
courts considered the merits of the defendant's challenge to the grand jury. He,
therefore, became entitled to federal collateral review of that claim. Accordingly, his
claim was reviewed by two judicial systems.
197. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
198. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2507 (1977). Professor Hart's analysis
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However, if constitutional rights are important enough to jus-

tify relitigation, they are at least important enough not to fall behind a virtually impenetrable barrier of failure to satisfy a local contemporaneous objection rule. This is not to say that failure to

satisfy state procedural rules is entitled to no weight or to as little
weight as Noia accorded it, 19 9 but rather to say that it is entitled to
more weight than Sykes accorded it. Moreover, by adopting the
adequate state ground as defined by Henry, Davis, and Francis,
the Court is according presumptive validity to the state procedural
bar which a defendant must overcome. Acknowledging that some,
possibly most, state procedural grounds barring review are "legitimate" in an abstract sense 20 0 does not mean that they should present an automatic barrier to habeas corpus in individual cases.
The question remains to what extent a defendant, whose rights
have allegedly been violated, has the obligation either to invoke

state process under state rules or to forego the right to raise his
claim at all. If the function of the writ of habeas corpus is to provide a continuously available mechanism to test constitutional
claims substantively, a strong argument can be made that only a
deliberate waiver should bar its litigation. 20 1 Even if the function of
of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), applies with equal force to Sykes:
[Brown] tells the state courts that the more liberal they are in considering
the federal constitutional claims of state prisoners on the merits the more freely they will be subjected to the delays and the indignity, as it is often felt
to be, of federal-court review of their decisions, whereas the more astute they
are to lay procedural traps for criminal defendants the surer they will be
of immunizing their decisions from federal examination.
Hart, supra note 14, at 118.
199. See text accompanying notes 160-162 supra.
200. Since state courts are charged with enforcement of constitutional rights,
they should be apprised of such claims at a time when adjudicating them will cause
the least disruption in the administration of criminal justice. Thus, the states have a
legitimate interest in having constitutional issues aired at the earliest possible moment. In this sense, contemporaneous objection rules, rules governing the making of
pretrial motions, and the conduct of posttrial procedures are rooted in legitimate
state interests.
201. Even a deliberate waiver does not necessarily require consultation with
defendant if the issue waived is one which counsel normally decides as a part of the
conduct of the trial. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975): "It is true
that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law
and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of
trial strategy in many areas." Id. at 820 (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1966); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439
(1963)). However, in such circumstances, it must be established that counsel had
considered the issue and, where necessary, had investigated any significant facts.
The enforcement of procedural defaults by counsel and the refusal to allow relitigation of at least fourth amendment claims raises anew the problem of the standard by
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the writ were to test the adequacy of state process, some further
inquiry would be needed beyond acknowledgment of the general
legitimate interest of the state in having claims raised and determined in its own courts. Moreover, where the issue is the right to
litigate a claim even once, it is not clear why the failure to comply
with a state procedural rule should bar relief where the error is
20 2
plain and easily correctable by the trial judge.
After Sykes, it might appear that almost any failure to raise a
claim 203 in the appropriate state court would bar federal review.

However, Estelle v. Williams, 20 4 Blackledge v. Allison, 20 5 and Hen-

derson v. Kibbe, 20 6 all decided between Francis and Sykes, cast at
least some doubt on the accuracy of that interpretation.
On the same day that it decided Francis, the Court decided
Estelle v. Williams. 20 7 In Estelle the respondent was tried in prison
clothing, after permission to wear civilian clothes had been denied
by a jail officer. Neither respondent nor his attorney objected in
court. 20 8 Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice indicated that
if respondent had been compelled to stand trial in prison garb, he

would have been denied a fair trial and would be entitled to relief.20 9 However, he concluded that "the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever
which the competence of counsel is to be evaluated. McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970), suggests a rather vague standard: whether counsel's advice fell
"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at
771. See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). These were cases involving
the counseling of a guilty plea. The lower courts are divided on the appropriate
standard in assessing the competence of trial counsel, and three different standards
can be found: (1) the proceedings must be a "farce" or a "mockery of justice" in
order to hold counsel's competence inadequate, see, e.g., United States v. Easter, 539
F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976). But see United States v. Daniels, 558 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.
1977), which suggests that this standard, long adhered to by the Second Circuit, see
United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 950
(1950), may be reconsidered; (2) counsel must meet "the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place," see, e.g., Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970); (3) counsel must meet the "minimum standard of professional representation," see, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of recent developments
in this area, see 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 245 (1977).
202. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). But see Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 512 (1976); note 234 infra.
203. See text accompanying notes 147, 196-198 supra.
204. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
205. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
206. 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
207. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
208. Id. at 502.
209. Id. at 504-05, 512.
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reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary
to establish a constitutional violation." 21 0 That respondent himself
had been aware of the issue, that Texas courts generally acceded to
requests to appear in civilian clothing, and that tactical reasons
could be imagined for failing to make the request were apparently
2 11
all factors in the Court's finding an absence of compulsion:
We are not confronted with an alleged relinquishment of a
fundamental right of the sort at issue in Johnson v. Zerbst ....
There, the Court understandably found it difficult to conceive of
an accused making a knowing decision to forgo the fundamental
right to the assistance of counsel, absent a showing of conscious
surrender of a known right. The Court has not, however, engaged in this exacting analysis with respect to strategic and tactical decisions, even those with constitutional implications by a
counselled accused.
• ..The reason for this rule is clear: if the defendant has an
objection, there is an obligation to call the matter to the court's
attention so the trial judge will have an opportunity to remedy
2 12
the situation.
Without referring to Noia, the Court reached a result at odds
with that decision. By assuming that a strategic decision was possible, the Court employed the language of Noia. By declining to
explore whether such a decision was made in the specific case, the
Court rejected Noia's rationale.
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred. 2 13 He
identified two situations in which a conviction would be upheld
despite a claimed constitutional error: where it can be shown that
the substantive right was "consensually relinquished, "214 and where
there has been an " 'inexcusable procedural default' "215 in failing
to object when the right "could have been protected." 216 Since
the right could have been protected, respondent should be held
to the failure to object.
In Blackledge v. Allison, 2 17 the proceedings of respondent's
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 512-13.
Id. at 506-12.
Id. at 508 n.3 (citations omitted).
Id. at 513 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring).

217. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
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state court guilty plea were not transcribed. Instead, the trial court
employed a preprinted form on which blank spaces were filled in
with respondent's answers. The form indicated that respondent said
that he understood the sentence he could receive and that no
threats or promises had been made to induce the plea 1 8 which
resulted in a sentence of from seventeen to twenty-one years in
prison. 2 19 The opinion by Justice Stewart indicates that respondent
tried, unsuccessfully, to secure state collateral relief, but it does
not set forth the grounds alleged in the application or the reason it
2 20
was denied by the state courts.
On federal habeas corpus, respondent alleged a broken sentence promise made in the presence of a third party, and said that
he had been instructed to answer the questions in court in such a
way that the court would accept the plea.2 2 1 The Court recognized
the need for the finality of guilty pleas, but noted: "[Airrayed
against the interest in finality is the very purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus-to safeguard a person's freedom from detention in
violation of constitutional guarantees." 22 2 Then the Court held that
although the representations made in open court were a formidable
barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings, they were not insurmountable. This was so apparently not only because of the detailed allegations, but also, and more importantly, because plea
bargaining was, at the time of this conviction, a sub rosa process
which did not allow for recording of underlying bargains.2 2 3 In a
sense, this case is a mirror image of Estelle v. Williams.2 2 4 In Estelle respondent was held to his failure to object because the Texas
22 5
courts would have granted relief if the objection had been raised.
In Blackledge respondent was not held to his failure to notify the
state court of a promise because such a plea bargain would not
have been acceptable to the court.
Two weeks after deciding Blackledge, the Court decided Henderson v. Kibbe, 226 reversing a Second Circuit decision which had
granted the writ because of the failure of the state trial judge

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 66 n.1.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 72 (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969)).
Id. at 74-77.
425 U.S. 501 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 208-212 supra.
431 U.S. 145 (1977).
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adequately to charge on the issue of causation. 2 27 The New York
State Court of Appeals had considered the issue of the adequacy of
proof of causation but had declined to consider the adequacy of the
2 28
charge because the issue had not been raised in the trial court.
The Second Circuit held that since the defense had consistently
challenged the sufficiency of the proof at trial, the failure to object
was not a deliberate bypass but an inadvertent omission. 22 9 The
Supreme Court apparently accepted this finding at least to the
extent of considering the failure to object not an absolute bar to
relief:
Orderly procedure requires that the respective adversaries'
views as to how the jury should be instructed be presented to
the trial judge in time to enable him to deliver an accurate
charge and to minimize the risk of committing reversible error.
It is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify
reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been
made in the trial court.
The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction
was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the
constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater
than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal. 230
The Court in Kibbe did not bar relief because of the procedural default, nor did it inquire into the reason for the default.
Instead, it denied relief on the merits. The Court painstakingly
explored New York law to determine what, if any, error there was
in the instruction and whether it was so defective as to deny due
process.231 Chief Justice Burger concurred on the ground that the
Noia deliberate bypass doctrine should not extend to "midtrial procedural omissions which impair substantial state interests. "232 He
would have barred the claim on this basis.
Thus, in Sykes and Francis, the Court deferred to a state procedural rule without examining the specific case. In Estelle and
Blackledge, the Court indicated a willingness at least to evaluate
227. Respondent was charged with murder for having robbed the deceased and
having left him, drunk, on a cold night, on a snow-covered road, without his glasses
and partly undressed, where he was killed by a speeding truck. Id. at 147.
228. Id. at 150.
229. United States ex rel. Kibbe v. Henderson, 534 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd,
431 U.S. 145 (1977).
230. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
231. Id. at 156-57.
232. Id. at 158 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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whether or not the state would enforce a constitutional right if
properly raised. To that extent, and assuming that they are still
2 33
viable, they may temper the strict rule of Sykes in future cases.
Kibbe, however, appears flatly inconsistent with Sykes, although
the two cases were decided slightly more than one month apart.
Assuming that the need for a federal forum still underlies habeas
corpus for state prisoners, and acknowledging the obvious interests
of the state in cleaning its own house, a proper balance lies somewhere between Noia and Sykes.
If federal habeas corpus must be available to vindicate federal
rights, inadvertence or oversight by counsel or defendant should be
insufficient to bar federal review regardless of the significance the
state attaches to its procedural rules as a general matter.2 3 4 On the
other hand, if competent counsel evaluates and rejects a claim respecting the conduct of the trial, that should generally be sufficient
to bar relief since it gives weight to the valid state interest and also
to the constitutional claim. If this is what Sykes means by "cause,"
it provides an appropriate accommodation of competing interests.
But if the Court will not accept such grounds where counsel appears generally competent, then the rule is too restrictive.
More disturbing is the Court's addition of a standard requiring
a showing of prejudice. It is very difficult to understand what place
this element has in an evaluation of waiver. If the Court means
that petitioner must show that, without the error complained of,
2 35
the result would have been different in a harmless error sense,
it requires a habeas corpus court to evaluate the merits to determine whether it should evaluate the merits. If the Court means
that the error complained of could have affected the outcome of the
233. Although Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), had been decided the
previous Term, Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), was decided only seven

weeks before Sykes.
234.

Moreover, where an error is plain on the face of the record and could have

been corrected by the trial court, a failure by counsel to act should not be dispositive. In Estelle, for example, the trial judge easily could have asked if defendant
wanted to wear civilian clothing. The court needed no additional facts to make its
inquiry beyond the physical appearance of the defendant. But see Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375 (1966), where the trial court was held to a duty to inquire into defendant's capacity to stand trial notwithstanding the absence of an objection. On the
other hand, in Kibbe the trial court was alleged to have made the constitutional error.
In such a case, there might be a higher duty on the part of counsel to call such error
to the court's attention. Yet, in Estelle the Court declined to find error because there
had been no objection, and in Kibbe it did not find waiver although there had been
no objection.
235. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
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trial, it is simply requiring an allegation of facts which, if proved,
would entitle petitioner to relief. This view would be wholly
2 36 it
reasonable, but since it has always been the law in any event,
seems unlikely that that is what the Court contemplated.
The Court adopted the cause and prejudice standard from
Francis v. Henderson.23 7 But that case involved the failure to object to grand jury composition. A trial and adjudication of guilt
under a higher standard of proof than is required for the grand jury
to indict ordinarily will obviate grand jury error. Moreover, the
state has a particularly high interest in not having to undo an
error-free verdict because of tainted pretrial proceedings which
could have been cured before trial. Such factors might militate in
favor of the result in Francis. But Sykes involved the process of
adjudicating guilt. Only if the error is harmless is it obviated. In
this context, engrafting a substantive requirement on a procedural
inquiry is inappropriate.
PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS:
THE ADEQUATE STATE HEARING

A third possible means of limiting habeas corpus would be to
abandon the writ as a means of providing a continuously available
mechanism for substantive review2 38 and to restrict it to a determination of the adequacy of state process. Where state process is
adequate, there would be no review of the merits. This has, for
some time, been the position of several scholars. 2 39 It has the virtues of consistency, economy, finality, and limited exacerbation of
federal-state relations. Its principal problem is that it does not provide the "added assurance" 2 40 which prompted the expansion of
the writ, and it is not clear that state courts are producing sufficiently correct results to limit substantive review to the vagaries of
the certiorari jurisdiction.
The inconsistent desires to limit federal oversight of state court
constitutional adjudication and to retain full federal authority to
review constitutional questions have led to inconsistent results.
To some extent the Court accommodated both these ends in
Townsend v. Sain2 41 by permitting a federal court to defer to state
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

ring).
241.

See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
425 U.S. 536 (1976).
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S 217, 226 (1969).
See, e.g., Bator, supra note 2; Hart, supra note 14.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-

372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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findings of fact where certain criteria were met. Moreover, it recently opted for reviewing only the adequacy of process in fourth
amendment cases242 and in the District of Columbia.2 43 In Stone v.
Powell ,2 44 the Court held that a federal court must accept the result
reached by the state court if there has been a fair opportunity to litigate the claim. In Swain v. Pressley,2 45 a unanimous Court accepted
the power of Congress to withdraw habeas jurisdiction from the federal courts and to substitute for it a comprehensive postconviction
remedy in the local District of Columbia courts.2 46 The statute, modeled after section 2255,247 provides that all collateral attacks on local
District convictions are to be brought in the local courts and that
there will be no habeas review of such convictions if the District
review process is adequate.2 4 8 The District of Columbia statute is

part of a comprehensive reorganization of local District courts designed, in part, to make the District more analogous to a state.2 49
The question now is whether and to what extent the Supreme
Court would defer to a state statute designed to provide all the
requisite incidents of collateral review.
There are some straws in the wind. First, one of the reasons
which has been advanced in favor of broad habeas jurisdiction is
that it enables constitutional claims to be considered by article III
judges with lifetime tenure.250 But in Swain, the Court minimized
the importance of that factor. 251 Second and relatedly, the inadequacy of state results was an important factor in broadening habeas
review.2 52 Recently, the Court seems more inclined to regard the
states with favor. 2 53 However, there is no particular reason to believe that the states are any more or less correct than they ever
were. 2 54 Third, many states did not provide comprehensive postconviction review even at the time of Noia. However, postconvic242. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
243. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
244. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
245. 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
246. Id. at 381. The statute is D.C. CODE § 23-110 (1973). See text accompanying notes 247 & 248 infra.
247. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
248. D.C. CODE § 23-110 (1973).
249. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 375 & n.4 (1977).
250. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389,
410-22 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
251. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 382-83 (1977).
252. See Bator, supra note 2, at 509-10.
253. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).
254. For example, it is difficult to see how the petitioner in Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1977), was denied relief in the state appellate process.
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tion relief is now at least theoretically available in most states,2 55
and Swain could be interpreted as a sign of increasing deference to
those procedures.
As an abstract matter, it can be believed that state performance has improved substantially since 1963, if only because more
attention to constitutional rights is required by Supreme Court decisions 256 and because counsel is mandatory. 257 What is not known
is the degree of improvement and the extent to which any improvement is the result of the availability of broad federal review.
That the Court has withdrawn substantive habeas jurisdiction in
only limited contexts and that it continues to review claims which
have received plenary state consideration seem to indicate that the
255. The following state rules provide reasonably comprehensive postconviction remedies: ALAS. SuP. CT. R. GRIM. P. 35; ARIz. REv. STAT. R. 24.2; ARK. STAT.
ANN. R. CRIM. P. tit. 43, R. 37.1-.5; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35; DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM.
P. R. 35(a); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.850; IDAHO CODE 9§ 19-4901 to 19-4910; ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to 122-7; IND. STAT. ANN. 99 3-1901 to 3-1925; IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 663.1-.44; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. R. CRIM. P. 11.42; ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, §§ 5501-5546; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 589.01-.30; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 532.010.710; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95-2601 to 95-2608; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3001 to
29-3004; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 177.315-.385; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-15-8; N.Y. GRIM.
PROC. LAw § 440.10; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to 15-222; N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 29-32-01 to 29-32-10; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.21-.36; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1151; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 138.510-.680; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 to
1180-14; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-9-1 to 10-9-32; S.C. CODE §§ 17-27-10 to 17-27-120;
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 23-52-1 to 23-52-19; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-3801 to
40-3820; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7131; W. VA. CODE §§ 53-4A-1 to 53-4A-11; WIs.
STAT. ANN. §§ 292.01-.46; Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-408.1 to 7-408.8. Of the states not listed
above, the following rules are statutory habeas corpus and/or coram nobis provisions
(unless otherwise indicated, the following are habeas corpus statutes): ALA. CODE tit.
15, §§ 21-1 to 21-33 (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1473-1508 (West 1977); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-466 to 52-470 (West 1960 & Supp. 1978); D.C. CODE
§§ 16-1901 to 16-1909 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-101 to 50-127 (1977); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 660 (1975); KAN. STAT. §§ 60-1501 to 60-1507 (1976); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO.
ANN. arts 351-370 (West 1977); MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 248, §§ 1-34 (West 1959);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 250, §§ 1-2 (West 1959) (writ of error); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 600.4301-.4387 (1977); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-43-1 to 11-43-55
(1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 534:1-32 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:67-1 to
2A:67-36 (West 1976); TEx. STAT. ANN. arts. 11.01-.64 (Vernon 1966); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-2-2, 78-35-1 to 78-35-10 (1953); VA. CODE § 8.01-654 (1977); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 7.36.010-.250 (1961).
256. Since 1963, the privilege against self-incrimination has been held applicable to the states, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), as has the prohibition against
double jeopardy, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The right to counsel,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the right to a jury trial, Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the right to confront witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965), and the right to a speedy and public trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967), have all been applied to the states.
257. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Court will not soon relinquish the power it has assumed. With so
many questions still unanswered, this is probably just as well.
Should the Court defer to state statutes and review only the
adequacy of process, it will be faced on a broader plane with the
problem which already exists after Stone and Swain: It is not entirely clear what adequate state process is. The Supreme Court has
not addressed what constitutes an opportunity for full and fair litigation since Townsend. That case was concerned with setting standards for deciding when district courts should make de novo deter258
minations of historical fact:
Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did
not receive a fill and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court,
either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding. In
other words a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the
state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the
259
relevant facts.
The Court was careful to state that this discretionary deference to
state courts did not relate to conclusions of law. 26 0 Stone addressed
the problem only in an ambiguous footnote; 2 61 Swain did not address it at all.
Three possibilities must be considered. The first involves the
cases where there has been no state determination of the claim at
all because either none was requested or none was timely requested. As to these, the adequacy of the procedural bar should be
26 2
evaluated in light of the federal interest.
The second group of cases is that in which a claim is raised
and a threshold determination is made that the application does not
allege facts which, if proven, would warrant relief.26 3 These cases
258. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 & n.6 (1963).
259. Id. at 312-13 (footnote omitted).
260. Id. at 318.
261. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.36 (1976). By use of the "cf." signal
before citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), the Court left unclear whether
the Townsend criteria apply in assessing the adequacy of state process under the
Stone rule, or whether the Court merely intended to suggest that some criteria
should be developed analogous to those in Townsend. For a discussion of the "cf."
signal, see A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION rule 2:3, at 7 (12th ed. 1976). The

lower courts have been grappling with this question. See, e.g., Gates v. Henderson,
568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S.Ct. 2981 (1977).
262. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
263. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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present pure questions of law. In these questions the federal courts
presumably have the most direct interest and expertise. 2 64 To the
extent that habeas corpus is a substitute for certiorari, it is significant that it is in these questions which the Supreme Court has the
greatest institutional interest. 265 On the other hand, state court determinations of pure questions of law do not involve intricate procedures and their adequacy is easily evaluated: whether there was
an unbiased tribunal before which a defendant could appear with
competent counsel. The only justification for habeas review of such
questions would be distrust of state courts coupled with the burden
on the Supreme Court. 2 66 Yet, the Court has decided many cases
on review of habeas petitions which involved no new factfinding by
the lower federal courts. 2 67 The net effect is to delay definitive
resolution of important questions.
Perhaps the largest category is those cases in which there has
been a state evidentiary hearing which, it is claimed, was procedurally so defective as not to produce reliable results. Non-fourth
amendment cases continue to be governed by Townsend. Lower
courts which have been faced with fourth amendment cases after
Stone have, for the most part, simply stated that they find the state
hearing to be full and fair without stating the standard by which they
reached that determination. 268 One possibility is that any mechanism which appears generally adequate is adequate. 269 Under this
view, no review would be made of the record. Another possibility
is that for this category the Townsend criteria would apply. Some
support for this is found in the Stone footnote mentioned above. 2 70
The contention that this construction would render Stone a nullity
could be answered by the argument that the Stone "opportunity"
language was meant to deal also with cases in which the issue was
264.

Id. at 318. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970).

265.

R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN,

SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 167-70 (4th ed.

1969).
266. Bator, supra note 2, at 510-23; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, supra
note 4, at 164-65.
267. See note 141 supra.
268. See, e.g., Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977); Bracco v. Reed,
540 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1976); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir.
1976). Only in O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 2981 (1977), did the Court attempt to articulate standards for review.
269. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977).
270. See note 261 supra.
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not timely raised and27that
this became even more necessary after
1
Wainwright v. Sykes.

An intermediate position would be that the petition would
have not only to allege facts which would entitle the petitioner to
relief, but also to allege absent or incompetent counsel, lack of
process to obtain witnesses, knowing use of perjured testimony, or
some other flaw typically thought to undermine a factfinding process. 2 72 Whether or not the result was fairly supported by the
record would, on the other hand, seem to relate more to the correctness of the result as a question of fact and law, and would be
reviewable only by way of certiorari. Adoption of any one of these
positions would depend on what is perceived to be the function of
the writ.
CONCLUSION

By failing to consider the function of habeas corpus in deciding
recent habeas cases, the Court has cast substantial confusion over
the area. While Noia was too broad procedurally and perhaps substantively, a federal system requires some federal review and some
consistency. The certiorari jurisdiction is probably inadequate for
this. Limitation of review only to the question of the adequacy of
state process is probably insufficient, a fact seemingly accepted by
the Court, and the addition of review where there is some question
of guilt does not aid matters. Such an inquiry is diversionary.
Any substantive limitation should focus on a due process inquiry taking account of the factors relevant to the right alleged to
have been violated. Any procedural limitation should focus on
whether a substantial right was sacrificed which either the defendant, counsel, or the court should reasonably have asserted. In
short, a rule which provides for precise relitigation of all claims is
too sweeping; a rule which almost automatically bars litigation even
once is too restrictive.
271.

97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).

272. See Bator, supra note 2, at 451-62; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?,
supra note 4, at 151-54, 167.
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